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Abstract 
 
Developing countries face considerable challenges in the design and operation of local 
infrastructure planning systems in decentralized or decentralizing countries.  Many of these 
are well documented, but the complex political economy environment in which planning 
evolves has received insufficient attention. The forces driving decentralization and other 
public sector reforms shape how planning emerges, functions and performs. Local planning 
involves a range of differentially empowered and variously motivated actors at multiple 
levels and in diverse ways. The dynamics among them can support or undermine authentic 
local planning, with potentially significant implications for results. This paper reviews the 
evolution of local infrastructure planning with a focus on least developed countries, 
outlining the key expected and observed relationships among decentralization, planning 
systems and infrastructure development. The main goal is to create greater awareness of 
political economy issues that could inform the design and management of more effective 
and pragmatic local infrastructure planning systems. 
 
 
 
  
2 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Developing countries often have complex, multi-level infrastructure planning systems 
that not uncommonly underperform relative to needs and expectations.
1
  These systems 
have undergone numerous transformations as development thinking and practice have 
evolved.  Many countries, however, continue to face great challenges in making local 
infrastructure planning and delivery more effective.  Political economy forces are a 
critical factor in how local infrastructure planning systems have developed and perform. 
 
Planning, both in general with respect to infrastructure, covers a vast landscape.  It can 
involve multiple levels of government and administration, from central to grassroots, and 
relationships among levels can be complex and poorly defined in law and/or in practice.  
Sub-tiers within levels may play a role in infrastructure. At each level, there is an array of 
interested and/or influential actors—elected bodies, government bureaucrats, and diverse 
nongovernmental entities ranging from business to civil society groups.  In aid dependent 
countries, international agencies can play a major role, and particularly in large urban 
areas, private sector firms may be engaged as infrastructure service delivery partners.  
Each actor faces incentives that may support or undermine infrastructure delivery. 
 
Infrastructure itself is diverse because of variations in its inherent characteristics, such as 
the extent to which it is “public” in nature, the scale at which it must be provided, and the 
types of skills required to deliver it, among others.  Land and natural resources, often 
subject to complex legal frameworks and contested control and use, are involved in 
creating and operating infrastructure, adding further complexity. The various levels, 
actors and characteristics of infrastructure shape the political economy environment in 
which it must be delivered. 
 
Some challenges of infrastructure planning have been at least partly created or 
exacerbated by the pursuit of the very reforms intended to improve public sector 
performance in developing countries. Decentralization, which has been an influential 
trend for more than two decades, typically augments existing local infrastructure 
responsibilities and introduces important new actors, processes, funding sources and 
accountability channels into development planning.  Existing actors, however, do not 
simply disappear, and political economy dynamics set in motion by decentralization can 
affect how local planning and the overall intergovernmental reforms in general perform.   
 
Beyond decentralization, reforms in service delivery and financing mechanisms pursued 
through sectoral line ministries, finance ministries and community driven development 
initiatives can further affect the development planning landscape. Such reforms may be 
undertaken in response to perceived threats from or independently of decentralization.  
                                                             
1
 There is diverse literature on infrastructure in developing countries, including the effects of infrastructure 
on development (e.g. Straub 2012), infrastructure policy (e.g. Estache 2004), outcomes (e.g. Briceno-
Garmendia et. al. 2004), finance (e.g. Kehew, Matsukawa and Petersen 2005, Estache 2010, Helm 2010), 
and private participation. (e.g. Harris 2003), The literature on infrastructure planning is primarily technical 
and sector specific.  Work on the political economy of local infrastructure planning in developing countries 
is limited, but the general political economy of decentralization literature discussed below is relevant. 
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Whichever the case, gaps and redundancies in service responsibilities and conflicts over 
power and resources can easily arise as the multiple—typically uncoordinated—reform 
processes unfold. These in turn can have consequential effects on the delivery of 
infrastructure and citizen confidence in and satisfaction with government.  
 
Other evolving dynamics can significantly affect local infrastructure planning.  The 
demand for more and better infrastructure increases with greater economic development, 
higher citizen awareness/expectations and the influence of external trends and global 
agreements (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals).  The 2008 global financial crisis 
affected resource availability for infrastructure and placed subnational governments in 
many countries under pressure to replace funds they could no longer get from national 
budgets.
2
 Spatial factors may also evolve in consequential ways.  Commercial and 
residential developments in legally separate jurisdictions, for example, may grow 
physically closer over time, making administratively independent jurisdictions more 
interdependent and potentially complicating infrastructure planning.   
 
Finally, local political dynamics can be very important. These are related to interactions 
among different types of subnational institutions (e.g. cooperation or lack thereof among 
neighboring jurisdictions in providing network infrastructure) and relationships between 
local governments and their constituents (e.g. the degree of political competition, the 
extent of elite capture and patronage, and the nature of citizen interactions with locally 
elected officials).  These dynamics can affect the success of decentralized planning 
systems in using securable resources for the right infrastructure in the right places.  
 
Given the vast scope of local infrastructure planning systems, approaches and influences, 
this paper is selective in coverage. A broad overview of the political economy landscape 
of infrastructure planning is provided in the first few sections, but the core of the paper 
focuses on the development of planning systems under decentralization, particularly in 
least developed countries. The next section briefly summarizes the evolution of thinking 
about development planning with a focus on the role of decentralization reforms that 
have emerged under varying political economy conditions. Section III provides a brief 
overview of infrastructure planning related roles played by key actors, and Section IV 
reviews how a range of public sector reforms beyond decentralization—with their own 
political economy dynamics—affect local infrastructure planning. Section V summarizes 
a country case that illustrates common challenges to local infrastructure planning and 
their political economy underpinnings. Sections VI and VII provide a more detailed 
treatment of local infrastructure planning with a focus on least developed countries, 
respectively outlining relationships between decentralization and planning systems and 
considering the role of planning systems in infrastructure development. Finally, the last 
section provides some concluding comments.  
 
  
                                                             
2 See United Cities and Local Governments (2010). 
4 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
II. The Basic Structure and Changing Context of Planning Systems 
  
Public sector development planning systems for infrastructure and beyond have 
historically been structured in diverse ways.
3
  In the post-World War II era of 
industrialized country support for developing countries, planning systems were based on 
a development model predicated on a large government role in the economy, and 
infrastructure planning was built around macroeconomic development needs.  Such 
planning was centralized and technocratic, although interactions among government 
levels allowed modest local input. Traditional urban spatial and land use planning was 
often conducted separately, sometimes through dedicated subnational systems and 
sometimes through central agencies. This general approach persisted in the era of rolling 
back the state that began in the 1980s, although there was more emphasis on public-
private partnerships to deliver roads, water and other major infrastructure.  
 
Planning systems 
 
Local planning—in the sense that it focused on local infrastructure and involved local 
actors—was, of course, occurring even in the era of heavy centralization.  National 
governments set up ministries, subnational administrations, and various bodies at one or 
more levels to play some role in planning.  Local infrastructure could be provided for in 
national, sectoral or subnational plans, and various mechanisms bridged certain aspects of 
one or more types of plan and involved different combinations of actors (Figure 1).   
 
A range of planning relationships existed, but in relatively centralized systems there was 
usually some type of hierarchical orientation, such that any one actor needed approval 
from a higher level. A wide variety of mechanisms, some in the national budget and some 
off budget, were used to finance infrastructure.  The planning process could be top-down 
(lower levels awaited plans or instructions for preparing local plans from the center), 
bottom up (central plans and budgets for local services were not prepared until requests 
from lower levels had been passed up and reviewed), or something in between.  The 
locus on accountability and control of resources, however, was dominantly upward.   
 
In some countries with local government traditions, semi-autonomous local planning 
could exist in parallel with the main planning system. Local governments might 
produce—sometimes independently from the national multi-level planning system—
urban or rural development plans, which commonly focused on infrastructure.  These 
typically had dedicated but insufficient funding sources—transfers or project funding 
mechanisms—attached to them.  Separate legal status and more independence in 
infrastructure planning and finance were more likely in metropolitan and larger urban 
areas, although still typically be subject to a national legal, administrative and financial 
                                                             
3
  See, for example, Agarwala (1983), Conyers and Hills (1984), Healey (1997), Sundaram (1997), Rodwin 
and Sanyal (2000), Sanyal (2005), Hall and Tewdwr-Jones (2010) and Healey (2012) for overviews from 
various perspectives on development planning and urban and regional planning. 
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framework.
4
  These bodies may or may not have elected councils, and there may or may 
not have been interjurisdictional planning or coordination in metropolitan areas. 
 
 
The emergence of decentralization 
 
As institutional and governance concerns became prominent and global political and 
economic conditions evolved, a wave of public sector restructuring, democratization and 
civic engagement reforms took center stage. This included a growing decentralization 
trend.
5
 As decentralization became more common in developing countries, an appropriate 
role of subnational governments in infrastructure had to be considered.  The approach has 
varied considerably across countries due to differences in political and economic factors 
driving reform, variations in the relative priority of decentralization and diversity in the 
institutional structures and systems operating when decentralization was initiated.
6
  
 
With respect to initial goals, it is well established that countries decentralize for various 
essentially political reasons.
7
  In some cases, transition from a military/authoritarian 
regime to a more democratic society, as in Argentina and Brazil, included moves to 
decentralize.  At the same time, some weakly democratic countries, such as Cambodia, 
decentralized modestly to reinforce the power of a dominant ruling party. A number of 
                                                             
4
 Smoke (forthcoming) reviews the literature on intergovernmental frameworks and provides some 
comparative information on a number of developing countries. 
5
 There is much literature on this trend.  A few general synthetic sources include: Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 
(1998), World Bank (2000), Bardhan and Mookerjee (2006), Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), Connerly, 
Eaton and Smoke (2010), and Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011). 
6
 See, for example, Atinc, Ndegwa, Taliercio, MacAntony and Mailei (2004) and Beard, Miraftab and 
Silver (2008). 
7
 A range of literature on this topic is reviewed in Connerley, Eaton and Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser 
and Smoke (2011). 
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post-conflict, post-crisis or fragile nations, such as South Africa and Uganda, pursued 
decentralization to build political credibility and national identity. In some crisis cases, 
such as Ethiopia and Indonesia, the main objective was to offset perceived subnational 
pressures for state disintegration.  The forces driving reform create incentives for system 
design and implementation, including planning, in varying ways and at different paces. 
 
Whatever the dominant political motive(s) for decentralization, complete restructuring of 
subnational institutions is uncommon.  Existing jurisdictions rarely disappear, although 
political forces may allow asymmetric empowerment (deconcentration versus 
devolution).  Even with genuinely transformative reform ambitions, the challenges of 
what happens to standing systems and processes can be daunting.  Agencies that lose 
power from a stronger subnational government role in infrastructure, for example, are 
likely to resist scaling back or eliminating deconcentrated planning systems. Thus, the 
original (more centralized) planning systems may continue to operate to various degrees 
in ways that are inconsistent with their role under decentralization. Moreover, sectoral 
ministries may adopt dedicated planning and financing mechanisms for specific services, 
sometimes in direct response to decentralization, further complicating coherent planning. 
 
The implications of decentralization for city planning have also varied considerably.  In 
general, urban jurisdictions, at least larger metropolitan areas, are granted more freedom 
and resources, and there have been efforts to promote urban development by improving 
local infrastructure planning in broader context.
8
  Steps to increase discretion and access 
to finance (e.g. through municipal development banks and facilitation of access to credit 
markets) are often accompanied by accountability and fiscal responsibility reforms.  
Urban local authorities, however, remain subject to varying degrees of oversight and 
control by national agencies, some of which can be onerous and counteract the forces that 
decentralization is supposed to unleash. 
 
In addition to formal public sector planning systems, there has also been a strong trend to 
develop community-based planning for small-scale infrastructure in many developing 
countries.  Initially these were mostly created as parallel systems that bypassed local 
governments, often where decentralization had not yet been adopted or was weak or 
where crisis situations created a need to get resources to impacted communities quickly. 
In some countries these community mechanisms have been more integrated with local 
government systems as decentralization reforms evolved, but in other cases they continue 
to function as separate systems that plan local infrastructure independently.
9
 
 
A core practical challenge for infrastructure planning in developing countries has been 
that institutional reforms have encountered and generated political and bureaucratic 
incentives that allow formal adoption of new systems but hindered their implementation 
and fail to motivate adequate modification of existing structures.  In addition, planning 
reforms have tended to be technical, commonly placing more emphasis on creating 
                                                             
8
 New and more integrated approaches to thinking about urban infrastructure planning as part of broad-
based, multi-actor city development strategies are discussed in World Bank (2009) and Frank (2011). 
9
 A synthetic review of the evolution of community driven development and various operational models is 
provided in Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt and Spector (2009). 
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formal systems than on developing the means, incentives and capacity for the political 
connection to constituents that is considered essential for successful decentralization.  
 
III. Overview of Actors, Institutions and Planning Roles under 
Decentralization 
 
A wide range of central actors has a role in designing and implementing the legal and/or 
constitutional parameters of decentralization
10
 that are relevant for infrastructure. 
National legislatures can face incentives to promote or inhibit decentralization, and how 
this plays out can depend on the degree of political competition. Various government 
agencies may have different opinions regarding how far decentralization should go and 
what their roles should be relative to local actors. In some cases, central agencies may 
face incentives to overtly or covertly obstruct decentralization of major functions, 
including infrastructure planning, when this undermines their powers and control over the 
often-substantial resources at stake. These agencies may also directly compete for control 
of infrastructure provision, and they may pursue policies that are consequentially 
inconsistent with the formal intergovernmental framework. 
 
A first step in understanding these bureaucratic incentives is to determine which actors 
are involved in the process and what role(s) they play, formally and informally.  Whether 
local planning systems are independent or integrated, they invariably face national 
guidelines and/or oversight. Most countries have an agency dedicated to developing and 
supporting local government/administration, such as a Ministry of Local Government, 
Home Affairs or Interior. Other agencies manage overall national processes, such as a 
Ministry of Finance, Planning, or Public Service.  Given the overarching nature of their 
functions, they usually have some control over agencies at all levels (except local 
governments in federal systems), and they have tendencies towards standardization and 
control. The framework and oversight are sometimes managed by the planning ministry 
and sometimes by the local government ministry.  In cases where more than one system 
exists, deconcentrated planning may be managed under the former and local government 
(devolved) planning under the latter.   
 
Sectoral ministries also have important responsibilities for infrastructure—roads, water, 
etc. Separate sectoral bodies that cross multiple jurisdictions, such as a roads or water 
authority, may also be created. In some countries, portions of the infrastructure portfolios 
may be coordinated under national agencies with specific mandates, such as a Ministry of 
Regional, Rural or Urban Development, or regional development bodies.  Sectoral and 
territorial agencies are typically oriented towards service delivery, so they are more 
concerned about technical inputs and outcomes than about building local institutions and 
governance, There are, of course, cases in which central ministries promote 
decentralization and local capacity building. 
 
Although the loss of central agency power and inter-agency competition to play 
prominent roles provide strong incentives for overtly or covertly obstructive behavior or 
                                                             
10
 Much of the relevant literature is synthesized in Connerley, Eaton and Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser 
and Smoke (2011). 
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careful institutional positioning, less obvious dynamics can also be at work.  Especially in 
least developed countries with weak institutions, informal mechanisms for raising and 
allocating resources may dominate formal systems.  These mechanisms are clientelistic or 
patrimonial in nature, and it is difficult for reformers to change long-established rules of 
behavior.
11
  This is particularly prevalent in certain environments, e.g. if transparency is 
limited, if informal rules are derivative of or validated by traditional norms or cultural 
allegiances, or if low civil service salaries create incentives for staff to extract resources 
by whatever means feasible. Even where it is possible to pursue reform under such 
circumstances, it is likely to take a long time. 
 
Subnational politics and institutional arrangements 
 
Beyond the behavior of the central government, local institutions and relationships 
matter. The most obvious concern is the extent to which elected councils represent their 
constituents versus get captured by local elites or higher-level politics.  Bureaucratic 
dynamics can also matter, for example where decentralization involved assignment of 
former central employees to new local governments.  In such cases, these employees may 
continue to look to national ministries for direction on infrastructure planning rather than 
to locally elected councils to which they now formally report.  National standards and 
some upward accountability justifiably remain important even in decentralized systems, 
but downward and horizontal accountability must also be developed and respected for 
decentralized planning to create appropriate incentives and realize its intended benefits.
12
 
 
Some types of devolved or delegated infrastructure services may be more efficiently 
delivered across multiple local jurisdictions, so provisions for interjurisdictional 
cooperation, such as special districts for specific services or metropolitan planning 
commissions that include several contiguous autonomous jurisdictions, can be important.  
Such mechanisms may be mandatory (imposed by the central government) or voluntary 
(formed at the discretion of the jurisdictions involved).  In either case, political dynamics 
and embedded incentives affect how the mechanism will operate and perform.  For 
example, the imposition of a special district may be resisted, and where cooperation is 
voluntary there are often issues with how the agreement will be governed by the multiple 
jurisdictions (with separately elected councils and separately appointed staff) involved, 
and this will have consequences for how it performs in delivering infrastructure. 
 
A few examples can help to illustrate the diversity and importance of metropolitan 
governance arrangements (Table 1).
13
 One model is unified metropolitan administration, 
as is practiced in Cape Town, a metropolitan municipality composed of several formerly 
distinct local governments. Cape Town prepares, as per national requirements, an 
Integrated Development Plan that is partly financed with resources from the central 
                                                             
11
 See, for example, discussions of public financial management reform in Malawi (Rakner et. al. 2004) and 
public sector revenue reform in Uganda (Fjeldstad 2006). 
12
 Much of the synthetic literature on this topic is reviewed in Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke (2011), and 
Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-Berthet (2010) provide a thorough overview of subnational accountability. 
13
 See, for example, Slack (2007), Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009) and Slack (2010). 
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government and partly with city resources.
14
  The Cape Town Partnership (CTP), an 
independent non-profit organization linked to the city’s development planning has been 
influential in pushing infrastructure development to promote private investment. The 
CTP Board of Directors includes private and public sector.  Some critics charge that the 
CTP and the city in general focus on the central business district and do not sufficiently 
take into account other parts of the city, but the integrated political structure and 
administration of the city and the broad involvement of key stakeholders seems to lead to 
a more effective planning process than occurs in many other metropolitan areas. 
  
In the Philippines, the central government created the Metropolitan Manila Development 
Authority (MMDA) to coordinate metropolitan planning and service delivery among the 
16 cities and one municipality located in the greater Manila metropolitan region. The 
MMDA is not considered very effective—there is a metropolitan plan, but each city tends 
to focus on its own needs.  Part of the problem is that MMDA is widely seen as a national 
agency with roots in the authoritarian Marcos era.  Another major problem is the 
financial dependence of MMDA on the center.  Resources are limited and institutional 
arrangements create few incentives or accountability mechanisms to induce individual 
city mayors to work beyond their own constituencies for the larger metropolitan good.
15
   
 
Nairobi has long been government by an elected city council that plans for the territory 
under its jurisdiction.  Over the years, a number of special service authorities have also 
been set up.  In 2008 the central government created the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan 
Development (see below), which was intended to coordinate across all local authorities 
(including the city council) in the greater metropolitan area. 
 
A very different situation prevails in the greater Cairo region, which incorporates five 
contiguous governorates (intermediate tier of Egyptian administration) and eight new 
cities.
16
  Governorates are part of a highly centralized system and have limited authority 
                                                             
14 See Darch and Emezi (2012) for more details on Cape Town. 
15
 See Nasehi and Rangwala (2011) for more detail on Manila. 
16
 See Algoso and Magee (2011) for more detail on Cairo. 
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unless the governor is politically powerful.  New cities were created to attract people 
from the Nile Delta to Cairo and have no formal relationship with local administration. 
They are overseen by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development 
(MHUUD). Governorates have limited authority and face fragmented planning and 
budgeting behavior of central agencies. Prior to the 2011 revolution, governors and new 
city managers in the Cairo region began an effort to create a strategic plan for greater 
Cairo with support from the MHUUD and donors. What will happen in the evolving 
environment remains to be seen, but the lack of a comprehensive plan for the Cairo 
region and poor incentives for coordination among component entities and creates great 
challenges for infrastructure planning and invites political maneuvering. 
 
These cases illustrate great variation in how metropolitan planning is managed.  The 
degree of institutional fragmentation, the role of higher level mandates in specific 
political environments, the incentives for politicians in separate jurisdictions to work 
together (whether from national policies or organic political forces), the existence and 
nature of alternative institutions or mechanisms for managing area-wide functions, and 
the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships of interested parties, among others, are all 
important factors.  These arise from specific political economy incentives and can create 
further dynamics that can support or undermine coordinated infrastructure planning. 
 
External actors 
 
The role of international development agencies can obviously be important in the 
developing world, particularly in aid dependent countries.  On the one hand, these 
agencies play a vital role.  At the same time, they may behave in competitive and 
uncoordinated ways that reinforce problematic incentives and behaviors of government 
institutions.  One agency, for example, may support devolved infrastructure planning 
through a Ministry of Planning or Ministry of Local Government, while others promote 
more centralized infrastructure planning through individual sectoral ministries (see 
below).  Such inconsistencies must ultimately be recognized and dealt with if a coherent 
and effective infrastructure planning system is to be developed and institutionalized.  
 
IV. Broader Public Sector and Governance Reforms and Their Impact on 
Local Planning 
 
As already suggested, other major public sector reforms, such as public financial 
management, civil service, service delivery and community driven development, are also 
highly relevant for decentralization.  The way these reforms are designed and unfold can 
have a major impact on the performance of local infrastructure planning.
17
 The basic 
problem stems from the competitive relationships among national agencies involved in 
public sector operations that have incentives to protect their own divergent interests, as 
outlined in various ways above.  These agencies are often poorly coordinated, and they 
are thus relatively free to pursue reforms that are inconsistent with each other.  The 
situation is exacerbated by the power imbalances among them, and it is reinforced by 
                                                             
17 These issues are discussed and more examples are provided in Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser and 
Smoke (2011). 
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international development agencies that too often competitively approach the 
programming of their support for public sector and governance reforms.  
 
Friction is common, for example, between the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) or 
its equivalent and the Ministry of Finance (MoF).  The former commonly (if not always) 
seeks to expand the role of local governments and enhance its own relationship to them, 
while the latter is often reluctant to relinquish fiscal powers to local governments or 
oversight of them to MoLG.  In some cases, conflicts stem from MoLG reforms that fail 
to meet sound PFM principles that the MoF has a legitimate interest in enforcing for all 
public entities. It is, however, often a result of MoF desire to excessively control local 
government fiscal behavior. Since the MoLG or equivalent is typically weaker than the 
MoF (because of stronger political connections and the power inherent in wielding legal 
control over the national budget), the latter often has the upper hand.   
 
The consequences of such a situation can be considerable. If MoF wishes, for example, to 
adopt PFM reforms that limit local government access to autonomously programmable 
development resources, then local infrastructure planning can be greatly weakened. 
Similar dynamics may emerge with other broad-based central agencies, such as a 
Ministry of Planning that is developing an unnecessarily centralized planning system or a 
Ministry of Public Service that decides to adopt reforms that unduly constrain the ability 
of local governments to make sufficiently autonomous staffing decisions.  
 
Other major players in decentralization and in infrastructure specifically are sectoral 
ministries, such as a Ministry of Roads and Transport or a Ministry of Water.  The dual 
impact of their common reluctance to relinquish control over resources and their focus on 
service delivery with less concern for local governance and institution building is often 
considerable. Sectoral ministries may exert a powerful centralizing tendency either 
through heavy management of resources officially devolved to local governments or 
through continued planning and delivery of services after their legal devolution.  Formal 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) promoted by donors often reinforce the incentives of 
sectoral ministries to pursue centralizing reforms for service delivery, commonly in 
conjunction with national poverty reduction or Millennium Development Goal strategies. 
 
The centralist tendencies of sectoral agencies and their reform programs coincide 
conveniently with those of finance and planning agencies, overpowering relatively weak 
local government ministries and nascent local governments.  Thus, a centralizing MoF 
PFM reform that reduces local government fiscal autonomy and simultaneous adoption of 
centralizing SWAps in key sectors can effectively neutralize local government 
infrastructure planning processes or reduce them to the limited role of providing an 
optional input to resource programming decisions effectively controlled by higher levels.  
 
In some cases, however, there can be clashes among the various central actors that impact 
local infrastructure planning. Sectoral ministries, for example, may pursue SWAps that 
create sector specific systems and procedures for managing services—mechanisms for 
channeling resources, special districts distinct from local governments, etc.—that are at 
odds with decentralization reforms and formal intergovernmental PFM, development 
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planning or civil service systems promoted by other cross-cutting ministries.  Even 
though relevant overarching ministries should be able to discipline such behavior by 
virtue of their legal powers, they may be unable to do so if sectoral ministers have strong 
political connections or international development partners, which provide considerable 
sectoral resources in aid dependent countries, prefer particular modalities.  The result can 
be a system of local infrastructure planning and finance with muddled incentives. 
 
Community driven development (CDD)—the umbrella for Social Investment Funds and 
other community-based mechanisms discussed below—is another common element of 
the governance reform agenda, and it is heavily promoted and supported by donors.  
CDD is qualitatively different than other activities discussed here because it is not 
primarily a component of public sector reform.  Although a centrally based government 
or quasi-government agency is normally the national administrator of CDD planning and 
financing mechanisms, the resources typically target nongovernmental or community 
based organizations with diverse decision-making and accountability mechanisms rather 
than popularly elected local governments. CDD is relevant for local infrastructure 
planning precisely because it finances small-scale local investments, many of which are 
or could be the responsibility of local governments.   
 
In countries where local governments are weak and CDD proponents are more concerned 
about community empowerment than public sector reform, CDD—and its dedicated 
planning and financing mechanisms—may undermine development of nascent local 
government systems. Citizens may come to view local infrastructure as the role of CDD 
mechanisms rather than elected local governments.  In addition, CDD bodies, unlike local 
governments, do not have access to regularized revenue sources.   
 
Together these realities raise concern about the effect of CDD on local accountability, the 
linkages between CDD and public investment (particularly for network infrastructure), 
and the source of funds required to operate and maintain CDD-financed infrastructure.  
All of these could be dealt with by appropriate design features, which might evolve as 
local governments become stronger.  In many countries, however, CDD continues to use 
independent planning and financing systems long after the need for a separate identity 
has passed, and this may have nontrivial consequences for local infrastructure planning. 
 
This brief treatment of how various public sector and governance reform efforts may 
affect local infrastructure planning cannot do justice to the range of issues involved or the 
complexity of the political economy landscape that surround them.  The overarching 
point, however, is clear.  Local infrastructure planning cannot be effectively reformed 
independently of other public sector and governance reform initiatives that could either 
support or undermine it.  The existing and potential relationships among these various 
reforms need to be documented, and the incentives of various actors to cooperate or 
obstruct improved local development planning needs to be understood.  
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V. An Illustrative Cautionary Case 
 
The evolution of development planning in Kenya illustrates the challenges created by 
political economy forces in the type of complex intergovernmental and multi-actor 
environment outlined above.
18
 The county has produced medium-term national plans and 
subnational land use plans since the colonial era, although they evolved in purpose and 
form as international conventions and local conditions changed. At the subnational level, 
there is a bifurcated system of planning and budgeting that reflects a dichotomy between 
the deconcentrated and hierarchical provincial-district system and the semi-autonomous 
elected local authority system. The former was strengthened and the latter weakened after 
independence.
19
  The post-colonial favoring of deconcentration was officially justified as 
means to build national unity in the ethnically diverse nation with competing visions of 
the role of central government, but critics saw an effort by the dominant tribal group and 
its political party to build a unitary state that was under their control. 
 
National development planning conducted under the authority of the Ministry of Planning 
and National Development (MPND) reaches down to administrative units at provincial 
and district level, which are under the Office of the President. Provincial and District 
Development Plans are prepared under MPND field staff. The subnational process occurs 
concurrently with the national process, such that it neither flows directly from nor truly 
influences the national plan. The politically motivated creation of many new districts has 
diluted infrastructure funds and staff in individual districts and compromised planning.  
 
Although a major share of line ministry resources flows through provincial and district 
budgets, some ministries maintain separate sectoral planning activities and/or set up 
dedicated regions/mechanisms (e.g in water and roads) for public services under their 
jurisdiction.  These may support better investments (this has not been well studied), but 
there is often inadequate coordination with districts and local governments that may also 
be active in the sector.  This can be a problem if these local actors face no incentives to 
assume the burden of operating and maintaining infrastructure not planned by them. 
 
The linkage of the planning to the annual budgeting process in the deconcentrated system 
is weak, and involvement of citizens or their elected representatives is limited.  Decisions 
are made by District Development Committees (DDCs) chaired by a presidential 
appointee. District staff of national ministries dominates DDCs, with only a few members 
from local governments and NGOs. This system emerged under the District Focus for 
Rural Development Strategy (DFRD) of 1983, a reform framed as returning “power to 
the people” in response to a 1982 coup d’etat attempt. Critics saw DFRD as reinforcing 
ruling party control and further weakening local government performance incentives. 
 
The local government planning system is fully separate.  The Ministry of Local 
Governent (MLG) initiated Local Authority Development Plans (LADPs) in the 1980s to 
program donor funds for local investments, and they were often poorly linked to physical 
development plans (mostly prepared by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Physical 
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 The country case is discussed more fully in Smoke (2003), Smoke (2008) and Smoke and Whimp (2012). 
19
 The system is summarized in Cohen and Peterson (1999) and Republic of Kenya (2005). 
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Planning).  As with DDPs, LADPs were poorly linked to local budgets, and popular 
participation mechanisms were weak.  A Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan 
(LASDAP) initiated in 2000 to allocate resources from a new transfer fund provided a 
partial linkage to the local budget and mandated participatory planning. This process has 
essentially replaced the LADP. As with districts, many new local authorities have been 
created for political reasons, further compromising infrastructure planning and provision.  
 
In addition to resources provided through the provincial-district and local government 
systems, the government operates (under MPND, the same ministry responsible for 
provincial and district planning) a mechanism for planning and financing community 
driven development at levels below district administration and local governments through 
the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF).  Substantial small-scale rural 
infrastructure is provided through CDTF.  Coordination with district planning and local 
government planning is ad hoc and varies greatly across jurisdictions. 
 
Finally, the Kenyan Parliament created a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2003 
with the stated purpose of fighting poverty by improving basic services.
20
  Rather than try 
to fix existing systems, the Members of Parliament opted to find another way to channel 
resources for local service delivery—one that served their political interests. There is now 
a planning process associated with CDF funds, but its link to other planning processes is 
ad hoc and generally weak. In recent budgets, an increasing proportion of resources under 
other programs have also been allocated on a constituency basis.
21
 
 
In larger urban areas, the role of the district planning system is limited, but the process 
for coordinating infrastructure is also relatively ad hoc.  There has, however, been one 
move to respond to the problems of fragmented urban planning. In 2008 the government 
created the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD) as part of the 
process of implementing Vision 2030, Kenya’s latest development strategy.  The mission 
of the MNMD is to ensure that the various jurisdictions work together so as “to manage 
the Nairobi Metropolis by providing sustainable infrastructural services and high quality 
of life to all its residents, visitors and investors” (http://www.nairobimetro.go.ke/).  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the development planning systems in Kenya.  All five of the 
existing planning/finance channels—sectoral, provincial/district, local government, 
constituency and community—have some role in local infrastructure provision.  While 
this situation is not necessarily undesirable, a number of consequential problems are 
evident.  First, there is extensive territorial overlap among the jurisdictions covered by 
these various systems, and this has been exacerbated by the above-noted creation of new 
districts and local governments.  Second, there is considerable lack of clarity about 
specific infrastructure responsibilities across them. Third, each of the planning systems is 
financed by different sources. Fourth, each system has its own political economy 
incentives and dynamics, and these inevitably come into conflict. Finally, given these 
concerns, the various plans and finance mechanisms are largely uncoordinated, and any 
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 Constituency Development Fund Act, Government of Kenya Law No. 10 of 2003. 
21
  For example, a percentage of funding for rural roads earmarked through the Road Maintenance Levy 
Fund is allocated by constituency. 
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coordination that occurs is ad hoc rather than systematic. Other public sector reform 
efforts—public financial management, civil service and sectoral—have largely ignored or 
constrained all but the deconcentrated system.  
 
Collectively, these structural and procedural issues have major consequences.  First, they 
generate redundancies and gaps in infrastructure provision. Second, accountability is 
compromised since citizens are unclear about which actor is responsible for specific 
infrastructure.  Third, lack of functional clarity, fragmentation of resources, and muddled 
accountability create incentives and opportunities for political dynamics and bureaucratic 
behavior that undermine efficient use of public resources.  Although Kenya may be a 
relatively extreme case, such problems are not uncommon in developing countries. 
 
Recent political developments and deterioration of government performance created 
conditions for a new constitution (2010) that will dramatically alter the intergovernmental 
system. Mandated reforms consolidate hundreds of districts and local authorities into 47 
newly empowered county governments. This should allow the eventual creation of a 
more integrated infrastructure planning and finance system, although to date there is little 
clarity on how the fragmented planning systems will be integrated in the new institutional 
landscape. 
 
Many lessons can be derived from the Kenya case, but the principal point for current 
purposes is the importance of documenting the larger institutional context in which 
infrastructure planning is taking place.  This context is in great part created by political 
economy dynamics.  Once the various institutions and associated planning systems are 
created, they are each subject to their own internal political economy influences and the 
political economy interrelationships that exist and develop among them.  Without an 
understanding of this context and the underlying and evolving political economy 
dynamics, efforts to improve local infrastructure planning are unlikely to succeed.   
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VI. How Decentralization Reforms Shape Subnational Planning 
 
The previous sections have outlined the larger context of local infrastructure planning. 
This section and the next one focus more specifically on how decentralization reforms 
shape subnational planning systems and then on how such systems may affect local 
infrastructure outcomes. The logic of the argument is summarized in Figure 3.  The main 
context of our discussion is that of aid-dependent least developed countries (LDC), where 
decentralization reforms involve major efforts to get the very basic systems in place and 
international development partners may play a significant role in supporting such efforts.  
 
Figure 3: Decentralization Reforms and Local Infrastructure Outcomes 
 
 
The extent to which decentralization reforms institute an effective subnational 
development planning system depends on the design of the reforms and ultimately on the 
political rationale and bureaucratic incentives behind their implementation. We have 
already stressed the centrality of domestic politics for initiating and sustaining 
decentralization reforms and the role of bureaucratic incentives in explaining their 
incomplete and fragile implementation. But it is also important to stress is that this is an 
inherently contested and dynamic process which continues to open (and close) space for 
action by domestic reformers and for supportive engagement by their international 
development partners
22
. Moreover, as argued elsewhere
23
, understanding the dynamic 
nature of the process is only the first step; it must then be followed by an analytical shift 
that places less emphasis on the contribution decentralization may make to a global 
democratization and good governance agenda and better understanding decentralization 
reforms as part of a domestic “developmental state-building” agenda. 24 Such an 
approach goes beyond recognizing that decentralization is driven by politics and asks the 
                                                             
22
 The case for more strategic and diversified, engagement of external aid in support of decentralization 
reforms, in a variety of developing countries contexts, is made in Ojendal (2010) Weimer (2009), Romeo 
(2003), Romeo and ElMensi (2011), Romeo (forthcoming),  
23
 Romeo (forthcoming) 
24
 The need for a more realistic “good-enough” governance agenda in international development is 
elaborated in Grindle (2004) and its relation to the developmental state building agenda is highlighted in 
Fritz and Menochal (2006) and Fritz and Menochal (2007). 
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critical question of whether it coexists with, or relates to, a developmental state-building 
project, an understanding of the potential of local development within it, and a related 
commitment to effective subnational planning.  This raises two general observations on 
the potential for decentralization to develop effective local planning.   
 
First, the weaker the link between the immediate political objectives of reform and a 
larger project of developmental statebuilding, the less likely that effective subnational 
development planning will ever emerge. Without a developmental underpinning in the 
very nature of the state, the formal addition of subnational planning to the national 
system of public resource management is bound to remain cosmetic, and a genuine 
transition from a centralized (hierarchical) to a decentralized (multi-level /negotiated) 
national planning system is likely to be blocked. Second, even where decentralization 
reforms are linked to developmental statebuilding
25
, an effective subnational planning 
system ultimately depends on a proper understanding of the nature and role of local 
development within national development efforts and therefore on the scope and degree 
of autonomy enjoyed by subnational authorities. We return below to common 
misconceptions regarding local development and local autonomy as key obstacles for 
genuinely decentralized development planning. Figure 4 summarizes these key 
relationships between decentralization reforms and effective subnational planning. 
  
Figure 4: From Decentralization Reforms to Decentralized Development Planning 
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 Evans (1995), and Leftwich (1995) contrast the “developmental state” model (whether democratic or 
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autonomy (Evans 1995) from internal and external interests, in fostering such expansion. 
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Beyond such generalizations, a more detailed assessment of how the design and 
implementation of politics-driven decentralization reforms affects the practice of 
decentralized development planning requires looking at four basic dimensions of a 
national decentralization policy. These include (i) changes in the architecture of the 
governance and public administration system, (ii) reassignment of functions across the 
system, (iii) reassignment of fiscal powers and financial resources and associated changes 
in public finance management, and (iv) changes in human resource management 
responsibilities among levels. Together these four dimensions provide a framework for 
assessing the transition from centralized to decentralized development planning and 
understanding actual arrangements occurring in diverse country contexts. Figure 5 
summarizes these dimensions and selected issues they raise for subnational planning. 
 
Figure 5:  Dimensions of Decentralization Reform Subnational Planning Systems 
 
 
Architecture of subnational governance and decentralized development planning 
 
Decentralization reforms introduce changes in the architecture of the subnational 
governance and public administration system, including in (i) tiers of local authorities 
and their mutual relationships, (ii) the degree of autonomy, (iii) internal structures and 
accountability relations, (iv) mechanisms for joint action, and (v) the national system for 
support and supervision. Issues with any of these elements impact the performance of 
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subnational planning systems. Definitive analysis must be country specific, but there are 
typical problems, some of which have been the subject of extensive literature.  
 
The first issue is that of the “right size” of a local authority. Smaller jurisdictions, often 
established as first-tier units, may lack the functional and fiscal capacity to be viable 
planning units. On the other hand, larger (provincial/ regional) jurisdictions are 
inadequate as units of  “local” development planning, if “local” is properly understood as 
leveraging a territorial identity and mobilizing community resources, including social 
capital. Assigning local planning responsibilities to units whose functions and capacities 
are severely constrained by their size, or assigning them to large units that lack the 
comparative advantage to promote territory-specific solutions and to mobilize community 
resources, may lead to costly inefficiencies (more below).  
 
The multiplication of subnational government tiers can also be problematic.  For 
example, intermediate authorities can be critical for an effective public sector and they 
are core actors in federal systems. In unitary systems with weak capacity and governance, 
however, they may receive autonomy prematurely or inappropriately. Stronger regional 
levels of administration may facilitate coordination of central and local government plans 
and action, but their political empowerment in emerging systems may complicate 
cooperation between elected national and local governments as well as constrain or 
undermine the role of the latter.
26
 In many cases, autonomous local government planning 
and stronger central-local government partnerships could be better supported by 
deconcentrating the state than by creating intermediate political authorities.
27
  
 
The most critical issue for establishing genuine decentralized planning is the degree of 
autonomy assigned to emerging local authorities. Whether the goal is to improve national 
program efficiency or to develop local policies and mobilize resources, it is ultimately the 
extent of their autonomy, understood as powers of initiative and immunity from higher 
levels controls (Clark, 1984) that may generate locally “added value” to centralized 
development efforts. Yet a quarter of a century into the latest wave of decentralization, 
local autonomy remains highly contested in theory and highly constrained in practice in 
many LDCs. Politics-driven decentralization reforms may create new subnational 
political bodies but mostly rearrange administrative and fiscal powers within the central 
administration rather than support local autonomy in making and implementing local 
plans, programs and budgets. This reduces subnational planning to a marginally valuable 
technical exercise with weak or no linkage with the political agenda of local councils. 
 
                                                             
26
 This is particularly the case in decentralizing unitary states where the basic principle of “non-
subordination” of one local authority to another is systematically violated and lower council decisions 
(plans and budgets) are subject to approval by higher levels. True local plans are relatively independent and 
realize synergies and complementarities through negotiation among multiple autonomous entities (local 
authorities at different levels and national and deconcentrated agencies). If higher level approval is 
required, local plans remain components of hierarchically organized regional plans, ultimately to be 
integrated into a single plan and budget, as would occur in any unreformed, centralized planning system. 
27
 Yet experience shows that it is easier for the initiators of politics-driven decentralization reforms to 
create a new provincial/regional council than to deconcentrate the state administration at those levels and 
direct it to support and cooperate with lower-level local authorities.   
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The disconnect between the political activity of the local elective councils and the 
preparation of local development plans, programs and budgets is compounded by the 
structural problems of weak accountability of local executives and administrations often 
created by politics-driven decentralization reforms. As already suggested, the prime 
objective of such reforms is to legitimize national government action at the periphery 
and/or to consolidate and diffuse the networks of political patronage of the party in 
power, and not necessarily to share development and service delivery responsibilities 
with autonomous subnational actors. As a result, the reforms stop short of establishing 
genuine local authorities with their own executive and administrative structures. To the 
extent that newly created councils cannot develop and implement their own plans, their 
role is reduced to approving subnational plans prepared and implemented by centrally-
controlled administrative agents, which at best “localize” national policies. 
 
Another concern is that political disincentives and technical complexities make multi-
level intergovernmental cooperation difficult. Once a multi-level governance and 
administration system is set up, formerly hierarchical relations among layers of a 
centralized administration should be replaced by “negotiated” arrangements between 
relatively autonomous public entities, as well as between them and community and 
private sector actors. Yet central-local cooperation remains elusive in decentralizing 
LDCs. In particular, contractual delegation arrangements
28
, which can facilitate gradual 
and selective decentralization of service responsibilities, have proven difficult to devise. 
And, contrary to common perceptions, the problem has often been as much or more one 
of bureaucratic disincentives and weak capacity of central agencies to structure and 
manage such contracts than lack of capacity of local authorities to implement them.   
 
Finally subnational planning systems are affected by confusion and conflicts about whom 
in central government should regulate, support and supervise their operation. As noted 
above, various key national ministries have dissimilar attitudes towards decentralization, 
and often opposing views on the scope and modalities of subnational planning. The 
consequences are multiple requirements and confusing guidelines that overwhelm rather 
than build the limited capacity of local government planning units. 
 
Functional assignments and decentralized development planning 
 
The scope and outcomes of subnational planning are obviously affected by what 
functions are devolved or delegated to local authorities. Lack of clarity makes it difficult 
for local governments to structure administration around specific responsibilities and link 
local development plans to the operations and budgets of their departments. As a result, 
subnational planning ends up being disconnected not only from the local political 
process, but also from the organization and daily work of the local administration.  
 
Beyond the effects of inadequate functional assignments, the quality of subnational plans 
and operations are also negatively affected by the inability of local authorities to fully 
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 These differ from either deconcentration or outright devolution arrangements and require contractual 
agreements by which local authorities make use of meaningful discretion to improve the delivery efficiency 
of central services for which the “contracting” central agency retains primary responsibility.   
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espouse and operationalize their own “general mandate” for local development, which is 
often provided for in decentralization legal frameworks
29
. Where decentralization reforms 
neither reassign specific services delivery functions nor support the adoption of a service 
delivery agenda under a general mandate, subnational planning ends up focusing on   
stand-alone, small-scale infrastructure projects. These projects are seen as the easiest, 
least controversial, highest political return, options, as need not be aligned with mandated 
functions and do not require potentially controversial, political deliberations about which 
service delivery operations local authorities should engage in by their own initiative.       
    
Subnational finances and decentralized development planning 
 
Ultimately, local planning systems are shaped by how local authorities are financed and 
local finances are managed. All too often politics-driven reforms create subnational 
authorities but fall short of empowering them with the full range of fiscal and financial 
instruments needed to perform developmental functions. The situation differs from 
country to country, and, within countries, between larger urban areas and less endowed 
rural jurisdictions, but most local authorities in LDCs typically suffer from: limited scope 
or capacity for own source revenue raising; legal or de facto exclusion from credit 
financing; lack of specialized national institutions supporting subnational capital 
spending, and inadequate mechanisms for contractual financing of delegated functions. 
 
The primary source of financing for local development plans, (and only incentive to 
pursue subnational planning), has often been grants from central government. These have 
been provided as more or less discretionary resources, either as part of a regular transfer 
system, or from more ad hoc and externally financed facilities
 30
.  The bulk of these 
grants have been spent on small-scale infrastructure, either because funds have been 
earmarked for that purpose by central governments or donors, or because infrastructure 
spending has been the default option for local authorities for the reasons suggested above.  
 
Thus, in many decentralizing LDCs, subnational planning systems have been largely 
shaped by various central grant mechanisms. Importantly, where these grants have been 
introduced as regular transfers for local budgets support, this has facilitated the adoption 
of statutory procedures for local planning programming and budgeting. By contrast, 
where grants have come from specific project-financing facilities, this has often been 
associated with the introduction of ad hoc, rather demanding
31
 and less sustainable, 
planning exercises essentially meant to allocate the resources of the financing facility.  
 
National mechanisms to transfer resources for subnational development spending and the 
donor-supported facilities (i.e. Local Development Funds–LDFs—and similar programs) 
that have often piloted or complemented them, have played important roles in the 
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 This point is often missed in the fiscal decentralization literature, where functional assignment is 
understood as the offloading to local governments of functions formerly provided by higher levels. 
30
 Donors-supported facilities of the first type include Local Development Funds (LDF) and similar local 
budget-supporting mechanisms, while examples of the second type include the Social Funds and numerous 
other sub-national project-financing facilities  
31
 This is particularly true in terms of mechanisms for popular participation in local government decision-
making   
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emergence of sustainable subnational planning systems in LDCs. By providing a 
minimum of locally programmable resources to emerging local authorities they have 
helped break the vicious circle of “no capacity-no responsibilities-no resources,” put local 
authorities on a “learning-by-doing” path of institutional development, and facilitated the 
local adoption of statutory and participatory development planning processes.
32
  
 
Yet if decentralization reforms remain incomplete and do not proceed to functional 
reassignments and diversification of financing instruments, the LDF-type regular (and 
necessarily modest) annual transfers end up being stretched much beyond their original 
function of creating incentives for local planning and management capacity-building, and 
they become the primary or only source for local infrastructure financing. We elaborate 
below on how this affects the type and quality of local infrastructure. Here we simply 
note that this modality has another effect on local planning: it often involves less rigorous 
investment appraisal procedures than those used by an independent financing facility. 
     
Local authority human resources and decentralized development planning 
 
Effective local development planning requires capabilities that are typically scarce in 
developing countries.  Necessary skills, particularly for strategic and participatory 
planning, are difficult to embed in bureaucratic routines and are not easy to develop in the 
first place since they depend more on experience than on specialized training.  In other 
words, effective subnational planning requires not only technical skills that people can be 
trained in, but also learning how to think strategically through experience.  Similarly, 
participatory planning training will neither make local governments participatory nor turn 
their constituents into active citizens, which require learning from working together. 
  
Incomplete decentralization reforms often hamper development of subnational planning 
capacity, as they do not effectively address the need for local planning professionals or 
develop regulations to allow local authorities to flexibly source planning skills in the 
professional services market. But even with fuller reforms, complete reliance of local 
authorities on private consultants would neither be desirable nor feasible because their 
effective use requires local authority capacity to manage their services and link them to 
both the political work of local councils and the organization of local administration.             
 
Returning to the core rationale of sub-national planning: local development  
 
The above review of how politics-driven, incomplete decentralization impacts local 
planning systems underscores a basic point. Effective development planning depends on 
the extent to which decentralization reforms, beyond their potential to foster good local 
governance, support local development and its role in a developmental state agenda. 
 
                                                             
32
 See UNCDF (1996). An early discussion of the role of LDFs as tools for local capacity building and 
initial steps in support of decentralized planning and financing is in Romeo (1999).   
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As we argue elsewhere
33
 the adjective “local” in “local development” refers not only to 
the where, but also and most importantly to the who and how of development promotion. 
Development is local if it is endogenous, open and incremental, that is: if it makes use of 
locality-specific resources, combines them with national/global resources and brings 
them to bear on national development as additional benefits in a positive sum game. 
 
Understood in this more specific sense, local development could be an integral part of the 
developmental state agenda and the object of a supportive national policy with a status 
similar to that of more conventional macro-economic and industrial policies. The 
principal instrument for its implementation would be a subnational planning system in 
which local authorities mobilize local resources and negotiate their joint use with state 
and civil society resources. Unfortunately, generic views of local development (as 
development that happens locally) continue to prevail, missing comparative advantages 
of local government and the developmental rationale of decentralization. This is seen in 
common “decentralization without autonomy” reforms, which set up subnational 
planning systems that “localize” national plans, but fail to generate genuine local plans or 
mobilize additional resources from civil society and private sector.     
 
VII. Subnational Planning and Infrastructure Development Outcomes 
We now turn to the question of how subnational planning systems set up by politics-
driven and incomplete decentralization reforms affect infrastructure outcomes. It is 
important to note that, no matter what drives decentralization and how far it proceeds, the 
scope for decentralizing infrastructure provision remains limited not just by technical and 
economic factors, but also and more importantly, by core political economy issues.  
 
The scope for decentralizing infrastructure  
As noted above, local authorities in many decentralizing LDCs end up spending most of 
their (limited) discretionary resources on stand-alone small-scale infrastructure projects 
This is the default option when incomplete reforms and political disincentives for local 
councilors prevent broader responsibilities for service delivery from being assigned to or 
claimed by emerging local authorities. The relative surge in local infrastructure spending 
at the early stages of decentralization is, therefore, more of a necessary corollary (a sort 
of price to pay) than an intended policy objective. It occurs as larger scale infrastructure 
remains centralized and no responsibilities for any infrastructure are formally devolved. 
The “pooling” of smaller infrastructure projects (for water, rural roads, rural 
electrification) into larger centrally managed programs also continues to be widespread. 
Central management of larger scale infrastructure programs that “pool” smaller-scale 
ones is often justified on technical-economic grounds (network integrity, high capital 
requirements, economies of scale, interjurisdictional benefits). Powerful political 
economy realities, however, are often equally or more important. In fact, the management 
of infrastructure is a notoriously “‘wet’ area of government”, offering great opportunities 
for illicit generation of funds that are critical to political parties in power (Booth and 
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 For a more extensive discussion of the role of local development as driver of decentralization reforms 
and the limits of “decentralization without autonomy” processes see Romeo (forthcoming)    
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Golooba-Mutebi 2009). These funds are used to extend patronage networks and effect the 
intra-elite distribution of rents, which are essential for managing risks of violent conflicts 
between elite factions and maintaining political stability, a common need in “limited 
access” political systems prevailing in less developed countries (North, et al. 2006). The 
extraction of funds, in turn, requires “well-oiled machines” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2009) that may be easier to control as units of central agencies than as multiple local 
administration departments. Unless the center can extract rents through local authorities 
while controlling their distribution and containing the risk of “runaway local elites”, more 
decentralization of infrastructure responsibility is unlikely. Within these constraints, the 
situation differs across countries, depending on whether decentralization also has a 
developmental rationale and if a role is seen for local development, as well as on political 
forces and dynamics that launching reforms unleashes.  
If accelerated economic growth is critical to sustain creating and distributing rents, 
decentralizing regimes may go beyond purely predatory logic to combine a political 
rationale for reform with a developmental one.  If the potential of local development is 
recognized, there may be a shift of resources to local authorities and more decentralized 
provision of infrastructure. Reforms may also open space for emerging political actors 
(within and outside dominant coalitions) to champion local development as an integral 
part of a developmental state agenda and eventually push for greater local autonomy in 
managing infrastructure. Thus, political and institutional environments may evolve and 
redefine roles of the multiple actors involved in local infrastructure, creating mechanisms 
for their interaction and shaping the political and personal incentives they face.  
These environments can be distinguished by how they institutionalize and regulate the 
main stages of the infrastructure project cycle, namely: (i) planning, (ii) financing and 
(iii) implementation. Actors whose incentives are shaped by these environments include 
national politicians from the locality, local councilors, local executives and staff, state 
agents operating locally, technical service providers, construction firms, community-
based contractors, materials and equipment suppliers, laborers, and infrastructure users. 
We selectively review their positioning and incentives in response to the regulatory and 
institutional framework for local infrastructure set by decentralization reforms. 
Planning local infrastructure 
Where decentralization reforms are driven by politics and fail to define local authority 
developmental responsibilities and autonomy, local politicians (councilors) essentially 
serve as agents of national political forces and are under pressure to pursue the goals of 
their patrons: legitimizing the party in power and extending its influence at the periphery. 
They therefore seek to both maximize the transfers they spend (as this is linked to their 
status with the party), and make the best political use of resources from the perspective of 
their central patrons. They have little incentive to link infrastructure spending to locally 
owned policies or service delivery agendas. Local planning exercises then result in a list 
infrastructure investments that are neither derived from locally owned development 
strategies nor support independent work programs of local administration departments.  
Such lists typically give preference to projects that are not politically controversial and 
spread benefits in the widest possible way. Rural roads construction in Cambodia is a 
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typical example. Another example from Bangladesh is the fragmentation of limited 
investable local authority funds into multiple micro-projects under “one community, one 
project” schemes, primarily conceived as labor-intensive local employment programs. 
The selected infrastructure projects may or may not respond to real local priorities, and 
may or may not represent value for money. While there are few systematic ex-post 
evaluations, most donor accounts and rapid surveys of beneficiaries tend to be positive.
34
  
Thus, local communities seem to appreciate such projects, and they generally cost less 
than estimated, even if issues of quality and implementation often arise (see below).  
Although these projects are not necessarily wasteful, it is hard to imagine they represent 
the best use of scarce local resources. Credible ex-ante appraisal is typically missing from 
subnational planning processes, not only because of local capacity limitations, but also, 
because local politicians have few incentives to let independent appraisal potentially 
constrain their political decision-making. Thus, local infrastructure investments are often 
selected through a subnational planning process that is not informed by technical or 
financial analysis, and investment decisions are ultimately driven by the urgency to spend 
immediately available resources on popular projects with widespread benefits.  
More generally, subnational planning processes introduced by politics-driven, 
incomplete, decentralization reforms, do not provide local politicians with incentives to 
align local capital programming and infrastructure investment decisions with either 
strategic planning or operational budgeting. As a result they may overlook larger, more 
complex projects that support a local strategic development vision but require greater 
efforts over a multi-year horizon to build partnerships and mobilize additional resources. 
They may also overlook smaller investments that build the capacity of their own 
administration to deliver certain services (and perhaps realize contributions from users).   
Beyond shaping incentives of local politicians, how subnational planning is framed also 
determines how deconcentrated agents based in the locality will participate in local 
planning and contribute to shape infrastructure outcomes. In many LDCs, local 
authorities remain embryonic, and deconcentrated agents are expected to help them carry 
out their functions. However, even when overseen by a strong governor (or similar state 
agent), who should coordinate and clear actions with elected councils, deconcentrated 
agents remain weakly accountable to these councils and have little incentive to transfer 
responsibilities to them or build their capacity. Instead they are often keen to recapture 
decentralized functions and resources for the center. In fact local planning may play an 
instrumental role in this respect if no distinction is made between multi-stakeholder 
jurisdiction-wide strategic planning
35
 and local authority corporate strategic planning.
36
   
When this is the case, deconcentrated agencies may heavily influence or formulate plans 
of emerging local authorities. After the creation of district local authorities in Cambodia, 
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 Abrams (2008) and Romeo and Spyckerelle (2004) assess local infrastructure investments funded by the 
Commune/Sangkat Fund (CSF) and Commune Infrastructure Development Fund (CIDF) of Cambodia. 
35
 Jurisdiction-wide strategic planning aims at developing a shared vision among multiple actors (public, 
private and community) operating in the locality, providing the basis for negotiations among them and 
guiding the preparation of each of their planning, programming and budgeting instruments. 
36
 For a review of the difference between, community or jurisdiction-wide strategic planning facilitated by 
local governments and the statutory instruments of their corporate planning, see Cities Alliance (2006). 
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for example, these agencies came to see local planning as a way to capture resources of 
new district authorities to finance investments they could not afford with their own 
budgets. State-appointed governors, who act as chief executives of local councils, also 
have incentives to support this view of local planning, which strengthens their role vis-a- 
vis local councils both as local development managers and policy makers. This scenario 
is common in countries experiencing the “decentralization without autonomy” discussed 
above. The result is localized national plans
37
 that local elected councils are pushed to 
endorse as part of a wider effort to legitimize the central government in the periphery.  
The infrastructure investments generated by this type of subnational planning system may 
be more service delivery oriented and less “free-standing” than those selected by 
councilors operating as political party agents in the locality, and they do often have a 
stronger link to sectoral agendas. But the technicians who formulate these projects may 
not face incentives to seek input from beneficiaries or to conduct proper technical and 
financial appraisal. The risk of costly technical error is low for “off-the-shelf” projects 
with standard designs (e.g. education, health care, administrative facilities), but it may 
rise for projects requiring site-specific assessment and careful management (e.g. 
irrigation, water supply, flood control). In addition, local agents of technical ministries 
tend to give less attention to non-engineering aspects of projects, including institutional, 
social, financial or economic feasibility and risks, which are critical for sustainability. 
Subnational planning systems designed to localize national plans may also lead to a sub-
optimal use of local authority resources, as pressures to give each sector a share of the 
programmable funds may reinforce the loss of a strategic territorial perspective. Overall, 
such planning systems do not take advantage of the potential efficiency gains expected 
when autonomous local governments formulate their own development strategies and 
negotiate their financing and implementation users and the local private sector. 
Financing local infrastructure 
Local infrastructure planning is driven by financing, and, as noted above, the structure 
and outcomes of local planning systems depends on available financing instruments
38
. In 
many LDCs, where the local authorities’ ability to raise own source revenue or access 
credit are limited, infrastructure spending depends on intergovernmental transfers, often 
piloted and/or supplemented by externally funded LDF-type facilities. Through formula-
based annual block grants, often with access conditions and performance criteria 
attached, these provide programmable resources that support a local development 
planning process. There may be a list of allowable or prohibited uses, but generally the 
transfer criteria are not meant to assess the developmental relevance of the infrastructure 
investments. This is left to how local councils strike a balance between advancing the 
interests of their local constituencies and serving the political objectives of their national 
patrons. This in turn depends on whether local authorities, both individually (through 
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 Genuinely local plans reflect the agenda of a local authority and mobilize the resources of a local polity. 
38
The main instruments include: (i) own source revenue; (ii) discretionary and conditional development 
transfers, (iii) specialized development finance windows (Municipal Development Funds, Social Funds) 
(iv) access to the capital market (municipal bonds, bank loans) and (v) direct access to international aid. 
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strong local leadership) and collectively (through independent national associations) 
eventually emerge as relatively autonomous political actors on the national scene. 
Resources transferred annually through LDF-type facilities are relatively small and may 
have to go back to the national treasury if unspent during the fiscal year, so they can only 
finance infrastructure projects that are very small, simple and quick. This reinforces the 
local political bias towards fragmented use of resources to maximize the number of 
beneficiary communities. If the fragmentation bias is resisted and attempts are made to 
invest in a large project that costs more than the annual LDF allocation (e.g. road link or 
water reservoir), the resulting implementation delay may reduce efficiency of resources 
allocated to the project by immobilizing capital, increasing costs and delaying benefits. 
Political and bureaucratic obstacles also work against the decentralized planning and 
financing of larger, more strategic infrastructure projects and the leveraging of LDF 
resources through co-financing arrangements with central agencies. Local politicians may 
be unable to effectively interact with the central administration or are reluctant to lose 
control of the project. More commonly, central agents, in the absence of national 
instructions and guidance, may resist venturing into the new and at least somewhat more 
complex arrangements necessary for co-providing infrastructure with local authorities. 
Other limitations also affect the degree to which LDF resources can be leveraged by 
mobilizing private and community resources for co-provision of services and related 
infrastructure (e.g.: pre-school/primary education, water supply, sanitation, transport). 
This critically depends on the quality of local leaders and the actual (and perceived) 
degree of their autonomy.
39
 The emergence of proactive, development-minded local 
leaders is often hindered by the politics-driven decentralization reforms discussed above.  
In general, where “pay-as-you-go” through LDF-style annual transfers is the only option 
available to local authorities for infrastructure finance, larger, more efficient investments 
are rejected in favor of smaller and/or less viable projects. Alternatively, their 
implementation may be split over several years, increasing costs and delaying benefits.
40
 
In principle, the limitations of annual general-purpose block grants could be overcome by 
establishing dedicated facilities that provide project-specific grants or loans for larger and 
more strategic investments. The main examples include Municipal Development Funds 
(MDF), many of which have been established with substantial external aid. Social 
Investment Funds (SIF) and to some extent Community Driven Development (CDD) 
programs, could be counted among such facilities if they can be used to support local 
authority investment programs. The design of these facilities has been heavily influenced 
by donors and has created specific incentives and disincentives for local actors. 
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 Many factors contribute to the emergence of effective local leaders. A most important one however is 
whether or not the local electoral system allows voters to express individual preferences. 
40
 Unfinished infrastructure projects and long implementation delays that retard benefits and inflate costs 
can occur for multiple reasons, but they are likely to be more pervasive and problematic where full funding 
of the investments cannot be secured upfront and the only available funding is from annual (typically 
modest and often volatile) central transfers. The authors observed the effects of this scenario almost two 
decades ago in Vietnam, where many unfinished district-level rural infrastructure projects with substantial 
“sunk costs” that could rarely be “rescued” by additional investments.     
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Conceived as specialized domestic financial institutions to extend concessional credit to 
local authorities, MDFs have run into difficulties and the original expectations of their 
proponents had to be scaled down.
41
 Many MDFs could only assist a limited number of 
creditworthy urban/metropolitan authorities. Smaller urban and rural authorities could not 
generate revenue streams to service debts for non-revenue generating infrastructure. 
Many local authorities, hamstrung by national regulations and low internal capacity, have 
been reluctant or unable to borrow even for revenue-generating infrastructure. The use of 
intergovernmental transfer intercept mechanisms for MDF loans created a moral hazard 
and disincentive for proper financial appraisal of investments. Opportunities arose for 
local politicians to shift resources from future service delivery and operation and 
maintenance spending to the immediately visible bricks–and–mortar projects they prefer 
without transparent justification of welfare enhancement or poverty targeting. 
By using capital grants SIFs avoid some difficulties of MDFs and can be key vehicles for 
financing subnational investment. In contrast to MDFs, SIFs were not born to finance 
local authority investment, but to support national pro-poor policies through delivering 
community-level social infrastructure (schools, clinics and water and sanitation). SIFs 
were also intended to disburse large amounts of external aid rapidly. As the types and 
quantities of SIF-eligible investments could not be generated quickly enough through 
existing local authority systems, SIFs introduced parallel planning processes. Initially 
these simply involved eliciting direct requests from communities informed of SIF 
resources (“first come first served”), but they were later replaced by participatory 
planning processes carried out in communities targeted by the SIF.  
Given their different nature, SIF-driven and local authority planning systems may 
generate different investment priorities even if they both finance schools, clinics and 
water systems.
42
 This is because the SIF offers local authorities an opportunity to shape 
the local content of a national infrastructure program, not necessarily to finance their own 
local priorities. The SIF also does not provide local authorities with incentives to assume 
greater responsibilities or to reflect them in local budgets, as the management of most of 
the SIF-financed facilities remains under the concerned sectoral ministries.  
Political economy analyses of SIF operations in Latin America
43
 have shown that the 
allocation of SIF resources to specific localities is often driven by political/electoral 
calculations and that the bulk of SIF resources were spent on technically simple 
infrastructure, often with off-the-shelf designs, which could be quickly delivered. This 
was justified by the original emergency response mandate of the SIF, but the bias for the 
quick and simple persisted because of the preferences of both local politicians and 
international aid agencies. As a consequence, the diversification of SIF investments has 
been slow and halfhearted, and spending on projects less amenable to standardized 
designs (e.g. water supply and sanitation) has remained relatively minor in SIF portfolios.  
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 See, for example, Peterson (2000) and Friere and Petersen (2004). 
42
 For an assessment of the different priorities revealed by the community-level micro-planning process 
introduced by the Social Fund and the municipal planning exercises in Nicaragua, see Romeo (2000).  
43
 See Schady (2000) and Penfold-Becerra (2006).  
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Beyond dedicated mechanisms for budget or project support from treasury or specific 
central agencies and programs, issuing bonds remains a potentially appropriate option for 
local authorities. Experience, however, suggests that the development of a sub-sovereign 
bond market depends on conditions that require relatively advanced levels of national 
development and local autonomy and must be sustained by a national policy recognizing 
the role of local development for national growth. These generally include a supporting 
regulatory environment, a diversified financial sector and an increased capacity for debt 
support and management by local authorities.
44
 Such conditions exist widely only in 
advanced developing and transition countries,
45
 and most bonds in developing countries 
have been issued by subnational states and major cities.  
Attempts however have been made to overcome the capacity limitations of smaller and 
less endowed jurisdictions, by developing pooled financing mechanisms.
46
 In the last 
decade, international agencies have been active in assisting central and local authorities 
in developing countries to access domestic and international capital markets for financing 
infrastructure, particularly in certain sectors, such as water supply and sanitation.  
Since issuing bonds requires a rating of local authority creditworthiness, the prospect of 
such financing for local infrastructure may pressure local politicians to exercise fiscal 
discipline and improve financial management. Unfortunately, such incentives are diluted 
where access to bond financing is made possible by credit enhancement mechanisms that 
are poorly designed and transfer all or most default risk to the national treasury. 
Implementing local infrastructure 
The legal framework regulating local infrastructure procurement also shapes the behavior 
of actors involved in local planning. A common problem is insufficient national attention 
to developing appropriate local authority procurement systems and capacity. Standard 
legal provisions and guidelines often largely reproduce the central procurement process. 
Local authorities, however, require flexibility to realize the benefits of decentralization, 
and central regulations may invite rule violation, abuse of exceptions and fiduciary risks, 
which can be great without strong enforcement systems and actions. 
Local authorities often encounter difficulties because of legal rigidities or inadequate 
central guidance on implementing infrastructure projects through community contracting 
or innovative service delivery programs that use community co-provision and co-
production arrangements. In addition, rules intended to minimize the influence of private 
contractors on local procurement, if not well formulated and explained, may impede 
efforts to leverage local social capital, strengthen local public-private cooperation and 
help develop the local construction industry. Standardized and inappropriate procurement 
rules may create incentives to avoid them. An example is the practice of artificially 
breaking procurement of larger projects into smaller contracts, or worse, to choose certain 
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 See Platz (2009) 
45
 These include India, the Philippines, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil and some other South American 
countries, Russia and several European transition countries. 
46
 Interesting pilot projects have been launched in Tanzania and Uganda under the UNCDF Local Finance 
Initiative (LFI). The conceptual approach is documented in Bond, Platz, and Magnusson (2012)  
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projects over potentially better ones because their small size allows avoidance of 
competitive bidding requirements for contracts above a certain amount.
47
  
Beyond the effects of the legal framework for local procurement, the efficient 
implementation of locally planned infrastructure depends critically on the capacities of 
the stakeholders. These include the capacity of the local administration to manage the 
procurement process, the capacity of local engineers and contractors to deliver quality 
services and works, and the capacity of local communities to oversee implementation.  
The capacity to manage infrastructure procurement is generally a function of the size of a 
jurisdiction and of a country’s overall development. It is particularly weak for small rural 
local authorities in LDCs. Efforts to build capacity may appear disproportionately costly. 
In some infrastructure programs in aid dependent countries, infrastructure spending is 
overshadowed by capacity building, forcing consideration of alternative arrangements for 
interjurisdictional cooperation and delegation of the procurement function. 
Different capacity constraints plague the engineering function. Local authorities could 
use private services, but national policies are often required to support the emergence of 
an engineering consulting industry that could sustainably serve local infrastructure 
development needs and make transparent the operation of the market for engineering 
services to local authorities. In many LDCs, local authorities source engineering services 
from deconcentrated agencies and accountability issues may arise. Deconcentrated 
technicians may assume the functions of both client and engineer, reducing transparency 
and compromising the monitoring role of local councils and user committees.      
Similar considerations apply to the local contracting industry, the development of which 
is constrained by the low volume of work available annually in a single jurisdiction. In 
this respect, the strong political preference of local authorities for “buying locally” may 
work against the interests of the most capable local construction firms, which are not 
helped by an extreme segmenting of the market. Much as in the engineering services 
industry, the construction industry could be effectively helped by the development of 
supra-local (regional) markets in which they could compete annually for multiple 
contracts until their level of capacity launches them onto the national market. 
Finally, community oversight may have a positive impact on the quality, timeliness and 
cost-effectiveness of local infrastructure implementation. This, however, requires the 
definition of clear rules of engagement of the concerned communities in the construction 
administration process. When this is not the case the consequences may be either an 
ineffective and cosmetic role for community monitoring, or, at the other extreme, the 
possibility for community groups to illicitly extract concessions from contractors (in the 
forms of materials leakages and/or undocumented extra work) that may eventually be 
recouped through quality reduction or cost increases paid by the local authority. 
Figure 6 summarizes key points from the preceding discussion, highlighting the typs of 
incentives that weak decentralization policies and institutional environments can create 
for the range of actors involved in local infrastructure development and outcomes. Some 
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 A recent report on Bangladesh by Abrams (2010) provides a good example. 
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of these incentives are at least partly inherent to the nature of the particular aspects of the 
process under consideration, but they can be exacerbated or worsened by the way in 
which national governments, or in the case of aid dependent countries, international 
development agencies, structure the local infrastructure development systems they 
promote and support. 
Figure 6: Policy Weaknesses, Negative Incentives & Local Infrastructure Outcomes 
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governments, with higher levels of government and with nongovernmental actors can be 
consequential. These dynamics can support authentic local infrastructure planning or 
undermine it, with potentially considerable impact on the results.  
 
This paper has only selectively covered the complex terrain involved, and much of the 
more detailed treatment focused primarily on the development of decentralized planning 
systems in least developed countries.  More work is clearly needed to better understand 
the political and bureaucratic dynamics of local infrastructure planning and their impact 
on infrastructure provision.  In specific countries, it is necessary to determine the mix of 
actors involved and their incentives to support, alter or capture the local planning process. 
With such knowledge, it should be possible in many countries to redesign local 
infrastructure planning systems in ways that would help to improve their performance. 
 
References 
 
Abrams J. 2008. Assessment on the implementation of the Commune Infrastructure 
Development Fund, IFAD report (unpublished).  
Abrams J. Hafiz B. Sung Kim H.  2010. Review of procurement practice in the 
Bangladesh Local Government Support Programme – Learning and Innovation 
Component, New York, NY: United Nations Capital Development Fund. 
Agarwala, Ramgopal. 1983. Planning in developing countries: Lessons of experience. 
Staff Working Paper No. 576. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Algoso, D. and J. Magee. 2011. “Structures of metropolitan governance and finance: A 
case study of Cairo.” Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
Atinc, Tamar Manuelyan, Stephen Ndegwa, Robert Taliercio, Tilla Sewe MacAntony, 
and Taranaki Mailei. 2004. Poverty reduction strategies in decentralized contexts: 
Comparative lessons in local planning and fiscal dimensions. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee, eds. 2006. Decentralization and local 
governance in developing countries: a comparative perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Beard, Victoria, Faranak Miraftab and Christopher Silver. 2008. Planning and 
decentralization. London: Routeledge. 
Binswanger-Mkhize, H. J. de Regt and S. Spector. 2009. Scaling up local and community 
development. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Bond, D., D. Platz and M. Magnusson. 2012, Financing small-scale infrastructure 
investments in developing countries, UN DESA Working Paper No.144. New 
York: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs.  
Booth D. and F. Golooba-Mutebi, 2009  The political economy of roads reform in 
Uganda, ODI Working Paper No. 307. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Briceno-Garmendia, Cecilia & Estache, Antonio & Shafik, Nemat, 2004. Infrastructure 
services in developing countries: Access, quality, costs and policy reform. Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 3468, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Cheema, G. Shabbir. and Dennis Rondinelli, eds. 2007. Decentralized governance: 
Emerging concepts and practices Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.  
          The Political Economy of Local Infrastructure Planning            33 
 33 
Cities Alliance, 2006. Guide to city development strategies: Improving urban 
performance. Washington, DC: Cities Alliance.  
Clark, Gordon L. 1984. A theory of local autonomy. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 74 (2), pp.195-208. 
Cohen, John M. and Stephen Peterson. 1999. Administrative decentralization in 
developing countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishing. 
Connerley, Ed, Kent Eaton and Paul Smoke, eds. 2010 Making decentralization work: 
Democracy, development and security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Conyers, Diana and Peter Hills, 1984. An introduction to development planning in the 
third world.  Oxford: John Wiley and Sons.  
Dalal-Clayton, B., D. Dent and O. Dubois, eds. 2003. Rural planning in developing 
countries. London: Earthscan Publications. 
Darch, Emma and Emezi, Akwaeke. 2012. Structures of metropolitan governance and 
finance: A case study of Cape Town. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy. 
Eaton, Kent, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke. 2011. The political economy of 
decentralization: Implications for aid effectiveness. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Estache, Antonio 2004. Emerging infrastructure policy issues in developing countries: A 
survey of the recent economic literature. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
_____. 2010. Infrastructure finance in developing countries: An overview. EIB Papers 
8/2010, Brussels: European Investment Bank, Economics Department. 
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge. 2006. Corruption in tax administration: lessons from institutional 
reforms in Uganda. In International handbook on the economics of corruption. 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 484-511  
Frank, D.  et al. 2011.  City development strategy: A conceptual framework, Cities 
Alliance Discussion Paper No. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Friere, Mila and John Peterson, eds. 2004. Subnational capital markets in developing 
countries: From theory to practice. Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press. 
Fritz V. and A. Rocha Menocal 2006 (Re)building developmental states: From theory to 
practice. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Fritz V. and A. Rocha Menocal 2007 Developmental states in the new millennium: 
Concepts and challenges for a new aid agenda. Development Policy Review, 
25(5): pp. 531-552. 
Government of Kenya. 2005. Guidelines for preparation, implementation and monitoring 
of the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan. Nairobi. 
Grindle, M.S. 2004. Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in 
developing countries. Governance 17(4): pp. 525-48. 
Hall, Peter and Mark Tewdwr-Jones, 2010. Urban and regional planning, London: 
Taylor and Francis. 
Healey, Patsy. 1997. Collaborative planning. Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press. 
_____, 2012. The universal and the contingent: Some reflections on the transnational 
flow of planning ideas and practices. Planning Theory, Vol. 11, pp. 188-207. 
34 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
Helm, Dieter, 2010. Infrastructure and infrastructure finance: The role of the government 
and the private sector in the current world. EIB Papers 5/2010, Brussels: 
European Investment Bank, Economics Department. 
Harris, Clive, 2003. Private participation in infrastructure in developing countries. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Kehew, Robert, Matsukawa, Tomoko and Petersen, John. 2005. Local financing for sub-
sovereign infrastructure in developing countries. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Litvack, J., J. Ahmad, R. Bird 1998, Rethinking decentralization in developing countries.  
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. and F. Vaillancourt, eds. 2011, Decentralization in difficult 
environments. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Nasehi, C. and R. Rangwala. 2011. Structures of metropolitan governance and finance: A 
case study on Manila. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
North D., J. Wallis, S. Webb, and B. Weingast. 2006, Limited access orders in the 
developing world: A new approach to the problems of development, Policy 
Research Working Paper 4359. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Ojendal, J. 2010. Risk analysis of Cambodian decentralisation. Stockholm: Swedish 
International Development Agency. 
Penfold-Becerra M. 2006, Clientelism and social funds: Empirical evidence from 
Chávez’s “Misiones” programs In Venezuela. Instituto de Estudios Superiores de 
Administración (IESA)  Caracas, Venezuela. 
Peterson, George. 2000. Building local credit institutions. Urban and Local Government 
Background Paper No. 3. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Platz D. 2009  Infrastructure finance in developing countries—the potential of sub-
sovereign bonds. UN DESA Working Paper No. 76. New York: United Nations 
Department for Economic and Social Affairs.  
Rakner, Lise et. al., 2004. The budget as theatre: The formal and informal institutional 
makings of the budget process in Malawi. London: UK Department for 
International Development. 
Rodwin, Lloyd and Bish Sanyal, eds. 2000. The profession of city planning: Changes, 
images and challenges. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Center for Urban Policy 
Research. 
Romeo, L 1999. Systems experimentation in support of decentralization reforms. 
Regional Development Dialogue Vol. 20, No. 2. 
______2000. Towards an improved municipal planning process, A report of the Second 
Rural Municipalities Development Program (Protierra-II)  INIFOM-World Bank, 
Managua, (mimeo).  
______2003. The role of external assistance in supporting decentralization reforms, 
Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23, No.1. 
______(forthcoming) Decentralizing for development: the developmental potential of 
local autonomy and the limits of  politics-driven decentralization reforms in J. 
Ojendal and A. Dellnas (eds) The imperative of good local governance: 
Challenges for the next decade of decentralization. Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press. 
Romeo, L. and M. El Mensi. 2010 The difficult road to local autonomy in Yemen: 
Decentralization reforms between political rationale and bureaucratic resistances 
          The Political Economy of Local Infrastructure Planning            35 
 35 
in a multi-party democracy of the Arabian Peninsula, in J. Martinez-Vazquez and 
F. Vaillancourt, eds. Decentralization in difficult environments. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Romeo, L. and L. Spyckerelle. 2004 Decentralization reforms and commune-level 
services delivery in Cambodia. Presented at the ADB-ADBI-UNCDF Workshop 
on "Local Government Pro-Poor Service Delivery" Manila, February 2004. 
http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/documents_and_reports/themati
c_papers/adb/UNCDF_Cambodia.pdf  
Sanyal, Bish, ed. 2005. Comparative planning cultures. London: Routledge. 
Schady, N. 2000.The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund, 
1991-1995, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No.2, pp. 289-304. 
Slack, E. 2007. Managing the coordination of service delivery in metropolitan cities: The 
role of metropolitan governance.” Policy Research Working Paper 4317, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Slack, E. and R. Chattopadhyay, 2009. Finance and governance of capital cities in 
federal systems. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.  
Slack, E. 2010. Financing large cities and metropolitan areas.” Toronto: Institute on 
Municipal Finance and Governance, Munk School, University of Toronto. 
Smoke, Paul. 2003. Erosion and reform from the center in Kenya,” in James Wunsch and 
Dele Olowu, eds., Local  governance in Africa: The challenges of democratic 
decentralization. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 
_____. 2008. “Local revenues under fiscal decentralization in developing countries: 
Linking policy reform, governance and capacity.” In Gregory Ingram and Yu-
Hung Hong, eds. Fiscal decentralization and land policies. Cambridge, MA: 
Lincoln Institute Press, pp. 38–69. 
_____. 2010. Implementing decentralization: Meeting neglected challenges. In Ed 
Connerley, Kent Eaton and Paul Smoke, eds. Making decentralization work. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Published, pp. 191-217. 
_____. 2012. “Metropolitan cities in the national fiscal structure,” draft for Roy Bahl, 
Johannes Linn and Debbie Wetzel, eds. Metropolitan government finances in 
developing countries. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute, forthcoming.  
Smoke, Paul and Kathy Whimp. 2011. “The evolution of fiscal decentralization under 
Kenya’s new constitution: Opportunities and challenges.” With Kathy Whimp. 
National Tax Association Proceedings. 
Straub, Stephane. 2011. "Infrastructure and development: A critical appraisal of the 
macro-level literature," The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 47(5), pp. 683-
708. 
United Cities and Local Governments. 2010. Local government finance: the challenges of 
the 21
st
 century. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Weimer, B. 2009. Decentralization of the African state – or state building through local 
governance- a paradox? Challenges to governance and decentralization in 
Mozambique. Report on the Conference on “Bringing the State back in: the new 
roles and responsibilities of the 21st century state”, The Association of 
Development Researchers in Denmark, Copenhagen, 12-13 May 2009  
World Bank. 2000. World Development Report: Entering the 21
st
 century. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
36 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
_____. 2009. Systems of cities: Harnessing urbanization for growth and poverty 
alleviation (World Bank Urban Strategy). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
UN Capital Development Fund. 1996. Local development funds: Promoting 
decentralized participatory planning and financing. New York, NY: UNCDF. 
Yilmaz, Serdar Yakup Beris and Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet, 2010. Linking local 
government discretion and accountability in decentralization,” Development 
Policy Review, 28 (3), pp. 259-293. 
Zetter, R. and R. White, eds. 2002. Planning in cities. London: ITDG Publishing. 
